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THE ABDICATION OF FREE
ASSOCIATION-ELEVATING THE
COURT ABOVE THE CONSTITUTION
IN CHRISTIAN LEGAL SOCIETY
CHAPTER OF THE UNIVERSITY OF
CALIFORNIA, HASTINGS COLLEGE
OF THE LAW V. MARTINEZ
Natalie M. Cooley*
N Christian Legal Society Chapter of the University of California,
Hastings College of the Law v. Martinez, the Supreme Court incor-
rectly held that Hastings College of the Law (Hastings) did not vio-
late the Constitution in imposing an "accept-all-comers" policy upon
student groups seeking recognition as Registered Student Organizations
(RSOs).1 The majority arrived at this mistaken holding as a result of its
selective application of the law. The issue of controversy in this case is
the appropriate framework under which to review the policy and the con-
stitutional claims against it.
Hastings offers an RSO program from which member organizations
can derive numerous advantages.2 Organizations with RSO status re-
ceive the following benefits: the receipt of financial assistance from the
school; the use of channels of communication such as the weekly school
newsletter, bulletin boards, and a school email address; the ability to par-
ticipate in the yearly Student Organizations Fair; and the use of facilities
and office space to host meetings and events.3 In pursuit of these bene-
fits, the Christian Legal Society (CLS) chapter of Hastings applied for
status as an RSO in 2004.4 As required, CLS included in its application a
copy of the bylaws mandated by its national organization.5 The bylaws
* J.D. Candidate 2012, Southern Methodist University Dedman School of Law; B.A.
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their constant encouragement and support.
1. Christian Legal Soc'y Chapter of the Univ. of Cal., Hastings Coll. of the Law v.
Martinez, 130 S. Ct. 2971, 2978 (2010).
2. Id. at 2979.
3. Id.
4. Id. at 2980.
5. Id.
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require every voting member and officer of the organization to sign and
abide by a Statement of Faith, which CLS interprets as prohibiting sexual
activity outside of a heterosexual marriage.6
To qualify for RSO status at the school, organizations must abide by
Hastings's Policy on Nondiscrimination. 7 Hastings interprets this policy
as an "all-comers" policy, meaning that any RSO "must 'allow any stu-
dent to participate, become a member, or seek leadership positions in the
organization, regardless of [her] status or beliefs.' '" It is disputed
whether this interpretation was in place at the time that CLS applied for
RSO status.9 Relying on the all-comers interpretation of the policy, Has-
tings refused to grant RSO status to CLS, marking the first denial of re-
gistration to a student organization in the history of the RSO program. 10
Inexplicably, Hastings had admitted other student organizations to the
program whose bylaws plainly did not adhere to the all-comers policy.11
Shortly after this denial of RSO status, CLS filed suit under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 alleging violations of its "First and Fourteenth Amendment rights
to free speech, expressive association, and free exercise of religion. 12
The district court granted summary judgment for Hastings on all of CLS's
claims. 13 On appeal, the Ninth Circuit based its two-sentence affirmation
of the district court's decision on the fact that the parties stipulated to the
existence of the all-comers policy and that the "conditions on recognition
[were] therefore viewpoint neutral and reasonable."'1 4 In its decision on
June 28, 2010, a 5-4 majority of the Supreme Court affirmed the Ninth
Circuit's decision that Hastings's all-comers policy was constitutional and
remanded for decision as to whether the policy as stated was mere pre-
text, "if, and to the extent, [that the argument was] preserved.' 15
The Court's correct, first step in reaching this conclusion was, like the
Ninth Circuit, to rely upon the stipulation and analyze Hastings's actions
under the school's interpretation of an all-comers policy rather than upon
the Nondiscrimination Policy as written.16 However, the Court then erro-
neously chose to lump CLS's separate free speech and associational free-
6. Id. Although the Court stated that CLS "exclude[d] from affiliation anyone who
engages in 'unrepentant homosexual conduct,"' CLS only barred these individuals from
voting membership or holding officer positions. Compare id. with Joint Appendix, vol. 1 at
*226, Christian Legal Soc'y Chapter of the Univ. of Cal., Hastings Coll. of the Law v.
Martinez, 130 S. Ct. 2971 (2010) (No. 08-1371), 2010 WL 372139.
7. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. at 2979. The policy provides, in pertinent part, that the school
"shall not discriminate unlawfully on the basis of ... religion .... sex or sexual orienta-
tion." Id.
8. Id.
9. Id. at 3003 (Alito, J., dissenting).
10. Id. at 3002.
11. See, e.g., id. (stating that the La Raza group "limited voting membership to 'stu-
dents of Raza background"').
12. Id. at 2981 (majority opinion).
13. Id.
14. Id. (quoting Christian Legal Soc'y Chapter of Univ. of Cal. v. Kane, 319 F. App'x
645, 645-46 (9th Cir. 2009)).
15. Id. at 2982, 2995.
16. Id. at 2982-84.
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dom claims together and to evaluate both under a limited public forum
framework. 17 This flawed selection of the appropriate law enabled the
Court to incorrectly decide the case in Hastings's favor.
The majority recognized the importance of the constitutional right to
associate, citing its own precedent which mandates that restrictions on
freedom of association remain subject to "close scrutiny," and permits
them "only if they serve 'compelling state interests' that are 'unrelated to
the suppression of ideas'-interests that cannot be advanced 'through...
significantly less restrictive [means].'"18 Nevertheless, the Court fash-
ioned a justification for utilizing a singular, less restrictive public forum
analysis for CLS's two distinct claims simply because it made more sense
to treat the speech and association claims together.1 9 Treating them sepa-
rately made "little sense," according to the Court, for three reasons: (1)
the same considerations that warranted less scrutiny in limited public fo-
rums for free speech apply to expressive association because the two
claims are similar; (2) to apply strict scrutiny would nullify the purpose of
limited public forums; and (3) unlike previous expressive association de-
cisions, CLS was placed under indirect pressure, rather than compulsion,
to include all comers.20 In support of the latter assertion, the Court factu-
ally distinguished Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, where the State of New
Jersey required the Boy Scouts to admit a homosexual gay rights activist
in opposition to that organization's value system.21 Although the Dale
Court deemed New Jersey's action a violation of the Boy Scouts' right of
expressive association, the Martinez Court drew a suspect distinction,
claiming that, unlike New Jersey's action in Dale that mandated the inclu-
sion of an unwanted member, Hastings's policy did not force the inclusion
of unwanted members. 22
Using the unsound decision not to distinguish CLS's free speech and
expressive association claims as its jumping-off point, the majority was
free to embark upon a public-forum analysis for both claims and found
the RSO program to be a limited public forum.2 3 To withstand constitu-
tional scrutiny, restrictions upon a limited public forum must merely be
"reasonable in light of the purpose served by the forum" and must be
viewpoint neutral.24 Regarding the "reasonableness" prong, although the
Court recognized that it must not defer to the university when consider-
ing matters of constitutionality, it nevertheless engaged in a largely defer-
ential review of Hastings's actions. 25 To reach the conclusion that the all-
comers policy was reasonable in light of its stated purpose, the Court
cited Hastings's goals of ensuring that "leadership, educational, and social
17. Id. at 2985.
18. Id. (quoting Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 623 (1984)).
19. Id.
20. Id. at 2985-86.
21. Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 644 (2000).
22. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. at 2986.
23. Id. at 2984 n.12.
24. Id. at 2988 (internal citation and quotation omitted).
25. See id. at 2988-91.
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opportunities afforded by [RSOs] are available to all students;" aiding the
school in regulating the Nondiscrimination Policy; "encourag[ing] toler-
ance, cooperation, and learning among students;" and "declin[ing] to sub-
sidize with public monies and benefits conduct of which the people of
California disapprove. '2 6 Further, because the Court noted that the all-
comers policy was an example of "textbook" viewpoint neutrality, it dedi-
cated little time to that argument and ultimately held for Hastings on this
second prong as well. 27
Writing for the four dissenters, Justice Alito lamented the Court's hold-
ing as operating on a principle of "no freedom for expression that offends
prevailing standards of political correctness in our country's institutions
of higher learning. '28 Though the dissent dedicated time to several
points that the majority dismissed, its correct result should have been
supported by directly addressing the majority's arguments. As the major-
ity noted, the dissent "spill[ed] considerable ink" arguing about the tech-
nicalities of "when the all-comers policy was adopted" 29 in an attempt to
evade the stipulation on a technicality. 30 The dissent first argued that
Healy v. James,31 is almost factually indistinguishable from Martinez and
should have controlled the decision before the Court, thereby resulting in
an invalidation of Hastings's policy on free association grounds.32 But,
noting that the Court disregarded Healy, the dissent then conceded to
undertake a limited public forum analysis to expose errors in the major-
ity's reasoning. 33 Again straying to discuss a point that the majority re-
jected, Justice Alito began his discussion under the Nondiscrimination
Policy.34 Finally, though the ensuing analysis under the all-comers policy
touched on CLS's free association claim and the standards under Dale,
the dissent took issue with the majority's limited public forum analysis. 35
The dissent stated that each of Hastings's stated policies that the Court
condoned 36 were not reasonable in light of the forum's purpose "to pro-
mote a diversity of viewpoints among-not within-registered student
organizations. '37 Again addressing a point to which the majority as-
signed minimal importance, the dissent urged that the all-comers policy
was mere pretext because it was not announced until the instant litiga-
26. Id. at 2989-90 (internal citations and quotations omitted).
27. Id. at 2993-95.
28. Id. at 3000 (Alito, J., dissenting).
29. Id. at 2982 n.6 (majority opinion).
30. See id. at 3005 (Alito, J., dissenting) ("What was admitted in the Joint Stipulation
filed in December 2005 is that Hastings had an accept-all-comers policy. CLS did not stipu-
late that its application had been denied more than a year earlier pursuant to such a
policy.").
31. Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169 (1972).
32. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. at 3007-09 (Alito, J., dissenting).
33. Id. at 3009.
34. Id. at 3009-12; see supra text accompanying note 16.
35. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. at 3013-15 (Alito, J., dissenting).
36. See supra text accompanying note 26.
37. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. at 3016 (Alito, J., dissenting) (internal quotation omitted).
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tion, was undocumented, and was not previously enforced.38 The dissent
contended that this issue should not be left for the Ninth Circuit to decide
on remand because that court will likely not have the authority to review
the issue due to the procedural posture of the case; instead, it should have
been decided in the Supreme Court.39
The Supreme Court's results-driven selection and application of which
legal standards to apply yielded an incorrect holding in Martinez. Moreo-
ver, while the practical and policy-based counterarguments in the dissent-
ing opinion sustain the correct result, the legal arguments therein lack the
full support that they could have been afforded. The major flaw in the
majority's argument is that it conflates CLS's free speech and expressive
association claims.40 While the dissent merely touches upon this argu-
ment,41 it should have been the basis upon which to correctly decide the
case.
As a threshold issue, the majority correctly chose to analyze the case
according to the stated all-comers policy instead of the written Nondis-
crimination Policy in view of the Joint Stipulation. 42 While the dissent
made an admirable attempt to dismantle the stipulation to reach the
proper holding,43 the all-comers interpretation of the policy was properly
before the Court. But, the accuracy of the analysis ends there. While the
Court itself noted that it has only "employed forum analysis to determine
when a governmental entity, in regulating property in its charge, may
place limitations on speech,"'44 it nevertheless erroneously glossed over
CLS's expressive association claim by offering three insufficient justifica-
tions for merging it with the free speech claim. 45 This error opened the
door for the Court to analyze both claims under the lower level of scru-
tiny afforded to speech in a limited public forum.46
Instead, the Court should have treated CLS's expressive association
claim as distinct from the free speech claim and subjected it to a higher
level of scrutiny. The Court's first attempted justification for doing other-
wise, based upon the similarity of the free speech and free association
claims, lacks merit. The need for more stringent protection of expressive
association is evident from the policy behind the constitutional right.
Where the Court's decision to analyze the two claims together errone-
ously implies that freedom of speech considerations should swallow the
expressive association claim, its own precedent holds otherwise. 47 The
Supreme Court has recognized that "[t]he Constitution guarantees free-
dom of association... as an indispensable means of preserving other indi-
38. Id. at 3017-18.
39. Id. at 3019.
40. See id. at 2985 (majority opinion).
41. See id. at 3009 (Alito, J., dissenting).
42. Id. at 2982 (majority opinion).
43. Id. at 3005 (Alito, J., dissenting).
44. Id. at 2984 (majority opinion) (emphasis added).
45. Id. at 2985-86.
46. Id. at 2986.
47. See Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 618 (1984).
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vidual liberties,"48 one of which is the freedom of speech.49 If the
freedom of expressive association was indeed granted with the aim of
protecting other freedoms, it is nonsensical that the claims should be
merged and analyzed under the same framework. Secondly, the Court's
elevation of the limited public forum places greater importance upon that
court-created entity than it does upon the constitutional guarantee of
freedom to associate. Should constitutional freedoms be treated secon-
darily to judicial constructions, individual rights may be easily eroded and
rendered meaningless. Finally, the Court's suspect distinction of Dale,
citing "compelled" inclusion in that case that was supposedly absent in
Martinez,50 likewise fails to justify its decision to merge the claims. The
alleged distinction is really no distinction at all. Mandating that an organ-
ization centered upon a belief system accept individuals as officers and
voting members who do not adhere to its own beliefs is the very defini-
tion of "forced" inclusion. As such, Martinez falls squarely within the
purview of Dale. Although the Court suggested that "the advent of elec-
tronic media and social-networking sites" mitigates the impact of non-
recognized status upon CLS,51 the inability to achieve RSO status on a
law school campus strips an organization of any meaningful way to
associate.
Because of the fundamental importance of expressive association, the
Court should have adhered to precedent allowing infringements upon
that right only when they "serve compelling state interests... that cannot
be achieved through means significantly less restrictive of associational
freedoms. ' 52 In Roberts, the Court recognized that a government action
that tries "to interfere with the internal organization or affairs of [a]
group," qualifies as an unconstitutional infringement upon this free-
dom. 53 As even the Martinez majority admitted in a parenthetical,
"'[t]here can be no clearer example of an intrusion into the internal struc-
ture or affairs of an association than' forced inclusion of unwelcome par-
ticipants."' 54 Because Hastings's policy imposed such forced inclusion
upon CLS, it should have been prohibited from instituting the all-comers
policy unless there were no means "significantly less restrictive of associa-
tional freedoms" 55 of achieving the RSO's goals. As it stands, the policy
offers an organization a choice between diluting its belief system to an
extent that would render its message meaningless or excluding it from
recognized existence in a manner that would virtually extinguish it.
Outside of forbidding all forms of association, it is difficult to think of a
48. Id. (emphasis added).
49. Id. at 622 ("An individual's freedom to speak.., could not be vigorously protected
from interference by the State unless a correlative freedom to engage in group effort to-
ward those ends were not also guaranteed.").
50. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. at 2986.
51. Id. at 2991.
52. Roberts, 468 U.S. at 623.
53. Id. at 622-23.
54. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. at 2986 (quoting Roberts, 468 U.S. at 623).
55. Roberts, 468 U.S. at 623.
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policy that is more restrictive upon associational freedoms. Even the
original interpretation of the Nondiscrimination Policy operated less re-
strictively, as evidenced by the La Raza group's ability to organize under
bylaws similar to what CLS proposed in this case.56 That policy evidently
achieved the RSO's goals, as it was never challenged prior to the instant
litigation.
While ultimately the Court's narrowly tailored holding will not result in
widespread changes, the immediate result thereof is to deny the Hastings
chapter of CLS its constitutional right of expressive association. In a
broader context, the holding sets a disturbing precedent for allowing the
Court to defer to judicial constructions above constitutional freedoms.
56. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. at 3004 (Alito, J., dissenting).
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